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Abstract
Though current research identifies which institutions are important as boundary 
conditions for entrepreneurship, questions remain about how they actually influence 
national entrepreneurial activity, particularly through start-ups. Specifically, the au-
thors attempt to answer the following question: How do formal incentives influence 
the start-up rates across countries? Through a conceptual framework where formal 
incentives and societal legitimacy represent formal and informal institutions, respec-
tively, the authors contribute to existing knowledge about national start-up activity by 
showing both the mechanism and conditions under which formal incentives increase 
the start-up rate. First, it is argued that formal incentives influence the start-up rate 
indirectly through the market opportunities available through economic development. 
Second, it is argued that these formal and informal institutions substitute for one an-
other. The arguments are confirmed with a panel dataset on 57 countries from the 
World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Surveys and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 
A key implication of the findings is that early efforts at stimulating economic develop-
ment, for example, by incentivizing foreign investments in new technology, can also 
kickstart the entrepreneurial activity as much as entrepreneurial activity also contrib-
utes to economic development in return. 
Colin D. Reddy (South Africa)
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INTRODUCTION
Three key contextual factors determine national start-up activity viz. 
the economic conditions surrounding the opportunities and resources 
available for entrepreneurs (Porter, Sachs, Jeffrey, & McArthur, 2002) 
and the formal and informal institutions that determine its incen-
tive structure (North, 1990; Acs, Desai, & Hessels, 2008; Acs & Szerb, 
2010; Stenholm, Acs, & Wuebker, 2011). Institutional theory provides 
the basis for theoretical arguments demonstrating when the effects of 
incentives on start-up activity intensify or weaken. Still, these theoret-
ical arguments have yet to extend beyond treating contextual factors 
as boundary conditions to examining how they influence national en-
trepreneurial activity, particular in its start-up phase. 
Currently, there exists inconsistent empirical support for the role of 
formal incentives in promoting start-ups (van Stel, Carree, & Thurik, 
2005; Klapper, Laeven, & Rajan, 2006; Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; 
Levie & Autio, 2008; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). This might be due to 
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measurement and multi-collinearity issues (Aidis, Estrin, & Mickiewicz, 2012). Some argue that formal 
incentives do not directly have the power to motivate entrepreneurs. They lead to increased competition 
when other entrepreneurs copy the profitable idea of the first-mover entrepreneur, with the resultant 
distribution of incentives among many entrepreneurs eventually crowding out and losing its power to 
motivate entrepreneurs (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Aldrich & Martinez, 2001). Nevertheless, this 
remains untested. 
We argue that formal incentives do not directly foster start-up activity, they instead first influence the 
structural changes leading to increased development (De Soto, 2003; Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005) and 
a greater opportunity set (Ciccone & Matsuyama, 1996) to enable start-up activity. In other words, 
formal incentives operate indirectly by first translating the market opportunities ordinarily available 
at various stages of economic development to actual start-up opportunities. Essentially, start-up op-
portunities are those market opportunities with the potential to generate economic value (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). Resultant entrepreneurial activity is an outcome of an occupational choice deci-
sion (Lucas, 1978; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979) to start a new business (Gartner, 1985). Thus, our research 
limits entrepreneurial activity to new business start-ups. Finally, we argue that the effectiveness of for-
mal incentives cannot be assessed without due consideration to existing levels of the societal legitimacy 
for entrepreneurship. 
We attempt to answer the following question: How do formal incentives influence national start-up 
rates? Using longitudinal quantitative procedures, we find that formal incentives influence national 
start-up activity indirectly through economic development. The role played by formal incentives be-
comes particularly important under conditions of inadequate societal legitimacy for start-up activity. 
Formal incentives substitute for this inadequacy. 
Our research study contributes to the institutional perspective of entrepreneurship by demonstrating 
how formal and informal institutions influence national start-up rates. Though we can identify which 
institutions are important for formal incentives and societal legitimacy, questions remain about how 
they actually influence markets (Boettke, Coyne, & Leeson, 2008). In particular, we still require an 
understanding of how these institutions influence new ventures within these markets (Stenholm et al., 
2011).
Institutional variables are often portrayed as conditions for entrepreneurship (Wennekers & 
Thurik, 1999). One of the puzzles to solve is the extent to which institutional variables serve as 
conditions or causes of national level start-up activity. We are inclined to think that societal legiti-
macy serves as condition or moderating variable, while formal incentives operate more directly to 
inf luence the economic situation. Legitimacy issues are deeply embedded in society and are slow 
to change (Scott, 1994). Formal incentives, on the other hand, operate close to economic activity 
(Williamson, 2000).
Further, we respond to calls to study the role of the local context in the decision to start a business 
from both supply-side and demand-side perspectives (Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). If either of these 
supply and demand perspectives is absent, then there is a risk of incomplete understanding of the 
variations in country-level start-up activity. On the demand side, it is necessary to model the eco-
nomic situation, which represents the existence of opportunities and resources at the disposal of 
the potential entrepreneur. This economic situation can be represented by a nation’s economic de-
velopment, which occurs with when a simple, low-income economy grows into a modern, high-in-
come economy (North, 1990). In fact, the Global Competitiveness Report groups countries at the 
basic level into factor-driven economies, which can develop into efficiency-driven economies and 
finally into innovation-driven economies (Porter et al., 2002). Because national income levels in-
crease as nations proceed through these levels, economic development has often been proxied by 
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relative income or per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (van Stel et al., 2005). Anokhin and 
Wincent (2012) correlated the log of per capita GDP in constant 1995 US dollars with a binary var-
iable innovation-driven economy and found it to be statistically significant.
Much of national start-up activity results when the entrepreneur, rather than generating them, instead 
captures profit opportunities from early economic development (Kirzner, 1973). Formal incentives are 
also an important aspect of the demand side, since they influence the profitability of opportunities and 
the deployment of resources like financial capital. On the other hand, an important antecedent of the 
supply-side perspective – the individuals that recognize the incentives and opportunities – includes the 
societal legitimacy of those individuals’ occupational choices.
We first define the abovementioned concepts and articulate a conceptual framework derived from the 
extant literature. We then go on to empirically test this framework and discuss a theory of an institu-
tional mechanism for national start-up rates. And then we discuss implications for management and 
suggest further research.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previously, researchers found inconsistent support 
for the direct effect of formal incentives on start-
up activity (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008; Klapper et 
al., 2006; Levie & Autio, 2008; Stephan & Uhlaner, 
2010; van Stel et al., 2005). For example, both reg-
ulatory protection and regulatory complexity had 
no significant effect on high growth start-up activ-
ity (Bowen & De Clercq, 2008). But when econom-
ic development was considered, regulatory com-
plexity had a negative effect on high-growth start-
ups within developing nations and a positive effect 
within developed nations. This implied a condi-
tional effect of economic development on the for-
mal incentives and start-up activity relationship. 
In other research, Stephan and Uhlaner (2010) 
suggest that formal incentives mediate the effect 
between cultural descriptive norms and start-up 
activity, confirming the institutional hierarchy 
argument (Williamson, 2000). In addition, Levie 
and Autio (2008) tested the effect of formal edu-
cation institutions on start-up activity and found 
that this effect is significant only when mediated 
by the opportunity perception of individuals.
Opportunity perception of individuals when 
translated to a macro level can be represented by 
economic development (Shane, 2003). Though 
start-up activity is known to influence econom-
ic development, there is also an overall positive 
trend in the way start-up rates vary with econom-
ic development (Acs & Szerb, 2009). Among less 
developed countries, an initial investment in a 
modern factory that produces ‘final goods’ will 
set-off a supply chain of opportunities in the re-
quired services and input products for these final 
goods (Ciccone & Matsuyama, 1996). This might 
include activities such as engineering and main-
tenance work, commerce activities to facilitate 
transactions, as well as transport and logistic ser-
vices (Gries & Naudé, 2009). Possibilities for the 
possession of idiosyncratic information increase, 
as the mix of more manufacturing and service 
activities is added to agricultural activities, since 
a wider combination of information possibilities 
and asymmetries arises (Eckhardt, 2003; Grégoire 
& Shepherd, 2012). 
How do governments sustain such a flurry of 
economic activity in these economies? They de-
sign and implement incentives to attract and re-
tain business and make possible the deployment 
of resources without any fear of expropriation. 
Incentives incite individual or organizations to 
action or greater effort, a reward offered for in-
creased productivity for example. Incentive type 
problems arise when two parties are present viz. 
the principal and the agent (Rees, 1985; Eisenhardt, 
1989). In market-driven societies, the government 
serves as the principal party who attempts to 
achieve its goals through agents like individuals 
and organizations. 
Governments use formal incentives, for example, 
the property rights that define and help entre-
preneurs retain the value they create, to motivate 
more deployment of resources and to facilitate ex-
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change by reducing transaction costs (Moran & 
Ghoshal, 1999). Other formal incentives include 
less procedures, short times and low costs of start-
ing a business (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, 
& Shleifer, 2002), as well as less arduous labor reg-
ulations in labor-intensive industries (Klapper et 
al., 2006). Governments also offer finance at low 
interest rates, tax abatements for property, and 
discretionary credits under the government’s cor-
porate income tax, low interest financing, social 
amenities, and public goods like a new road to 
a factory to attract big business or to incentivize 
them to continue their operations in the region. 
Formal incentives may also include the funding 
of research and development (Bartik, 2005). On 
the other hand, disincentives can occur when the 
law does not protect and enforce the contractual 
rights of entrepreneurs (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999).
An increase in formal incentives leads to a signif-
icant increase in economic development (Rodrik, 
Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Xu, 2011). For exam-
ple, economic development has been traced to en-
forcement of property rights (Scully, 1988; Acemoglu 
& Johnson, 2005; Shleifer, 2009), non-confiscato-
ry taxes and contract enforcement (Scully, 1988; 
Gwartney, Lawson & Holcombe, 1999).
Thus far, we have considered the role of the formal 
institutional environment through its incentive ef-
fect on economic development activity. However, 
formal institutions are guided by the norms and 
values underlying a society’s informal institutions 
(Thornton et al., 2011). At the macro-level, out-
comes like entrepreneurial activity through start-
ups are as much a result of government incentives 
as they are of the society (Rodrik et al., 2002; 
Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003). 
Societal legitimacy for entrepreneurship develops 
when some groups in society deem starting a busi-
ness to be socially acceptable or consistent with 
their norms, values, and beliefs (Jepperson, 1991). 
Society confers legitimacy – “a generalized per-
ception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, be-
liefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) – to 
economy activity. Legitimacy can be sought prag-
matically through responding to societal self-in-
terest, morally through obeying certain approved 
norms and cognitively through applying taken 
for granted methods. Whereas cognitive legitima-
cy derives from widely shared social knowledge, 
moral legitimacy derives from the values of soci-
ety, which indicates the extent to which its peo-
ple admire entrepreneurial activities such as cre-
ativity and innovation. In a more pragmatic form 
of legitimacy, society supports start-up activity 
for its material gain. Society may also recognize 
the autonomy of the businesses involved in these 
activities. Unlike pragmatic legitimacy, moral le-
gitimacy rests not on an evaluation of the bene-
fits to society, but on whether entrepreneurship is 
the ‘right thing to do’. On the other hand, cogni-
tive legitimacy rests not on any form of evaluation, 
but on a taken-for-grantedness (Suchman, 1995). 
Using societal legitimacy to represent this societal 
environment, we could argue that it moderates 
the indirect effect of formal incentives on entre-
preneurial activity through start-ups. 
2. HYPOTHESES
The notion that opportunity perception serves 
as a mediator between institutional forces and 
start-up activity (Levie & Autio, 2008) is appeal-
ing. By viewing economic development as a macro 
level proxy for the availability of start-up oppor-
tunities, we could be able to translate Levie and 
Autio’s (2008) finding to a macro perspective. This 
will enable us to examine how both institutions 
and economic development influences national 
start-up rates. We delineate the incentive struc-
ture of institutions into formal incentives like tax 
and antitrust policies and societal legitimacy type 
incentives like the admiration of entrepreneurs. 
Whereas judges, legislators and bureaucrats may 
change, enact or enforce formal incentives (North, 
1990), society uses ‘rules in operation’ rather than 
just ‘rules in force’ (Ostrom, 2009). Legitimacy is-
sues, in particular, become crucial when consid-
ering broader samples including developing coun-
tries and those with diverse cultural backgrounds 
(Liñán & Chen, 2009; Iakovleva, Kolvereid, & 
Stephan, 2011). That societal legitimacy is impor-
tant can also be observed from the evidence that 
the same formal incentives imposed on differ-
ent societies produce different outcomes (Jütting, 
2003). This might be due to significant stakehold-
er groups who hold notions of what is legitimate 
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arising from their own norms, values, and beliefs 
that conflict with the outcomes being targeted by 
formal incentives (Safran, 2003; Webb, Tihanyi, 
Ireland, & Sirmon, 2009). Specifically, we attempt 
to answer the following question: How do formal 
incentives influence national start-up rates? Our 
solution is depicted in Figure 1.
On the way to economic development, countries 
compete for labor, capital and economic activi-
ty by offering formal incentives to firms wishing 
to invest in them (Weingast, 1995). Formal in-
centives are particularly important to secure the 
capital resources required for economic develop-
ment (De Soto, 2003). Securing the best resources 
is a primary economic problem confronting those 
countries aspiring towards increasing economic 
development (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). Formal 
incentives, particularly in the form of market-ori-
ented regulations, become necessary for economic 
development when it becomes increasingly com-
plex to transact (Acs et al., 2008a; Acs & Virgill, 
2010). For instance, when the economic structure 
advances through innovation, intellectual proper-
ty laws ensure that the enterprise or individuals 
owning the innovation will be protected from un-
savory parties involved in potential market trans-
actions. Under these circumstances, innovators 
and resource providers become confident that they 
can appropriate the value attached to their efforts 
(Autio & Acs, 2010). We thus hypothesize that:
H1: An increase in formal incentives leads to an 
increase in economic development.
Though technological changes has dominated the 
discussion of how changes in economic structure 
(Solow, 1957; Blau, 1987; Porter et al., 2002; Acs & 
Armington, 2004) give rise to opportunities, social 
and demographic changes also accompany a coun-
try’s economic development (Porter et al., 2002). 
These include the changes in consumer demand 
(Reynolds, Storey, & Westhead, 1994; Audretsch 
& Keilbach, 2004) due to high disposable incomes. 
Consumer needs for variety occur when people in 
more developed nations experience greater desires 
for self-realization; and such needs can be met 
when income levels increase (Jackson, 1984), mak-
ing the introduction of new products less risky. 
Collectively, these changes from economic devel-
opment will give rise to abundant opportunity for 
individuals to start businesses. Therefore, we hy-
pothesize that:
H2: An increase in economic development leads 
to an increase in start-up rates.
We observe from hypotheses 1 and 2 above that 
formal incentives influence the economic develop-
ment and economic development in turn influenc-
es the start-up rate. Economic development plays a 
mediating role between formal incentives and the 
start-up rate. This is in line with arguments that 
economic development results from the adoption 
of particular institutions and not entrepreneur-
ship, which is an “omnipresent aspect of human 
action” (Boettke & Coyne, 2003, p. 67).
Formal incentives turn ordinary opportunities 
to profit opportunities – the kind of opportuni-
ties that attracts entrepreneurs. This means that 
formal incentives are unlikely to influence start-
up rates without the presence of opportunities to 
start businesses. This is where economic develop-
ment plays an important role. Much of national 
start-up activity results when the entrepreneur 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework
Perceived 
opportunities/perceived 
capabilities
Formal 
incentives
Societal 
legitimacy
National start-up 
rate
H4H3
H1
H2
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rather than generating them instead captures prof-
it opportunities from the technological develop-
ment accompanying early economic development 
(Kirzner, 1973). Potential entrepreneurs then rec-
ognize these opportunities from changes in tech-
nology to produce variants of services and inputs 
to large manufacturing enterprises (Ciccone & 
Matsuyama, 1996). These include the opportuni-
ties to start manufacturing and service type busi-
nesses within the supply chains of the pioneer 
businesses. Moreover, potential entrepreneurs al-
so use the wealth from increases in per capita in-
come to access resources to exploit opportunities. 
Wealth also brings with it desires for the products 
and services (Jackson, 1984). We argue that:
H3: The effect of formal incentives on start-up 
rates is fully mediated by its effect on eco-
nomic development.
Both formal and informal institutions form the 
incentive structure for economic activity (North, 
1990). When one is not present, we expect the oth-
er to compensate for it. Therefore, we expect the 
indirect effect of formal incentives to be more im-
portant at low levels of societal legitimacy. In par-
ticular, the indirect effect of formal incentives on 
national start-up activity occurs through econom-
ic development with its increasing availability of 
resources and opportunities for start-up activity. 
In an ambiguous incentive context, potential en-
trepreneurs will evaluate these opportunities on 
social cues (Aldrich, 1999; Kwon & Arenius, 2010). 
In particular, the societal legitimacy of start-up 
activity influences the perceptions of these oppor-
tunities (Welter & Smallbone, 2003). An overall 
effect results where societal legitimacy moderates 
the relationship between economic development 
and start-up activity (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 
2000; Hayton et al., 2002). Potential entrepreneurs 
in a low legitimacy context will struggle to access 
the increase in resources available. In these situ-
ations, the role of formal incentives becomes im-
portant and works to compensate for the low levels 
of societal legitimacy. On the other hand, nations 
need not rely on wholly formal incentives when 
high levels of societal legitimacy for start-up activ-
ity are present. Under these circumstances, socie-
ty views entrepreneurs with pride and this seems 
adequate to spur on individuals to make use of 
the increase in resources available from economic 
development. Such societies can easily overcome 
some of the apparent disincentives from formal 
government policies and regulations, since mem-
bers of such a society recognize and value the op-
portunities for individual freedom through own-
ing and operating their own business. We suggest:
H4: Societal legitimacy moderates the indirect 
effect of formal incentives on start-up rates 
such that this indirect effect decreases at high 
levels of societal legitimacy.
It is noteworthy that we do not hypothesize the di-
rect effect of either formal incentives and societal 
legitimacy or their interaction on start-up activity. 
This is in accord with our theory that they are but 
conditions for start-up activity. 
3. METHOD
3.1. Data collection
We used the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) and World Bank Group Entrepreneurship 
Surveys (WBGES) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) database to construct a country-level 
panel dataset for up to 57 countries over the peri-
od from 2000 to 2009. This resulted in a dataset 
of 238 country-year observations comprising 155 
developed country-year and 83 developing coun-
try-year observations. Because we used lagged val-
ues in our regressions, country-year observations 
dropped to 155 in some of our models.
The WBGES tallies new business registrations 
across the world, limiting the application of this 
research to formal economic activity (Klapper & 
Delgado, 2007; Acs et al., 2008b). Entrepreneurs 
who are motivated by an opportunity to grow 
their business also tend to register their enterpris-
es (Levie & Autio, 2011). While GEM data meas-
ure the potential for start-up activity, the World 
Bank data measure actual start-up activity, albeit 
at a formal level in terms of registered start-ups 
(Acs et al., 2008b).
To operationalize economic development, we rely 
on per capita GDP data based in US dollars, avail-
able from the IMF. To assess a country’s formal 
incentives or societal legitimacy, we rely on GEM’s 
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national expert survey. Individuals with knowl-
edge about their economies are probed about the 
entrepreneurial framework conditions (EFC) in 
their country. GEM uses standardized questions 
and validated measurement scales about these 
EFCs (De Clercq, Lim, & Oh, 2011). The panel of 
experts must include a supplier, an academic with 
knowledge about the country’s entrepreneurship 
challenges, as well as an entrepreneur. Country 
aggregate scores for each EFC derive from the 
mean of the 36 expert responses per country. 
The EFCs measured conditions for start-up activi-
ty such as financial support, policy and regulatory 
conditions, the business content of primary and 
higher education, business services, market con-
ditions, R&D conditions, general entrepreneurial 
capability, entrepreneurial culture and entrepre-
neurial image. The responses were collected on a 
five-point Likert scale. The five-point Likert scale 
comprised of completely false (1), Somewhat false 
(2), neither true nor false (3), somewhat true, (4) 
or completely true (5). It weighted the multi-item 
scale on the factor loadings of individual scale 
items.
4. MEASURES
Start-up activity
This is based on entry density, which is defined 
as the number of newly registered limited liabili-
ty companies per 1,000 working-age people, aged 
15-64 years old (Klapper & Delgado, 2007). The 
WBGES uses official business registers to provide 
cross-national data on the number of newly regis-
tered businesses (Acs et al., 2008b).
Economic development
It has been recognized that economic development 
results in increasing per capita income (van Stel 
et al., 2005; S. Wennekers, A. Wennekers, Thurik, 
& Reynolds, 2005). We use natural log transfor-
mations of gross domestic product per capita data 
from the IMF database. To obviate concerns about 
reverse causality from start-up activity to eco-
nomic development, the lagged value of income 
per capita is used. A lagged value of income per 
capita also accounts for the time taken for entre-
preneurs to identify and then exploit the opportu-
nities arising out of any technology changes from 
a country’s efforts at economic development.
Formal incentives
We formed a multi-item scale with items from the 
GEM policy and regulations EFC and the mar-
ket openness EFC. The resultant 11-item scale’s 
Cronbach alpha was 0.91. The policy and regula-
tions EFC comprises seven items probing expert 
opinions ranging from policy support for start-up 
activity to opinions on the response time when ap-
plying for permits and licences, the tax burden, the 
predictability of regulations and coping whether 
new businesses cope with regulations. The market 
openness EFC comprises four items including the 
ease of entry into new markets, the cost of market 
entry, being blocked by established firms and the 
effectiveness of competition legislation. Our meas-
ure thus extended beyond considering the quality 
of policies regulations around taxes and licences 
to consider also the facilitation of market entry.
Societal legitimacy
We developed a scale combining all three forms 
of legitimacy viz. pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
(Suchman, 1995). We used the entrepreneurial cul-
ture, entrepreneurial social image, and entrepre-
neurial capacity EFCs to proxy pragmatic, moral, 
and cognitive legitimacies, respectively. Our re-
sultant 15-item scale’s Cronbach alpha was 0.93. 
The entrepreneurial culture EFC comprises five 
items probing whether national culture supports 
individual success, emphasizes self-sufficien-
cy, encourages risk-taking, encourages creativi-
ty and emphasizes individual responsibility. The 
entrepreneurial social image EFC comprises five 
items probing entrepreneurship as an appropriate 
way to become rich, a desirable career choice, at-
tracting a high level of status and respect, media 
attention and thoughts of entrepreneurs as com-
petent and resourceful individuals. The entrepre-
neurial capacity EFC comprises five items probing 
whether people know how to start and manage a 
small business, start and manage a high-growth 
business, are experienced in starting a new busi-
ness, have the ability to mobilize resources and 
can react quickly to good opportunities for a new 
business. 
304
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.17(1).2019.26
4.1. Control variables 
We included several controls to increase the ro-
bustness of our models. We controlled for the 
population of nation, which can ref lect the po-
tential for market demand (Levie & Autio, 2011). 
Structural changes in an economy – increasing 
its market orientation – can give rise to start-
up opportunities (Bowen & de Clercq, 2008). To 
control for this, we used a dummy variable indi-
cating whether a country is a transition econo-
my, defined as one that has transitioned from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-oriented 
economy. In our dataset, these included Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, and Slovenia. The dominance 
of incumbents may alter the opportunity land-
scape for new entrants. Following the practice 
of Levie and Autio (2011), we include a measure 
of industry structure. Like them, we controlled 
for industry structure by using GEM’s index of 
established entrepreneurship in the country. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can increase 
the financial access to entrepreneurs (De Backer 
& Sleuwaegen, 2003; Ayyagari & Kosová, 2010). 
We therefore control for FDI as a percent of a 
nation’s GDP. We also included time fixed ef-
fects to account for unobserved characteristics 
across years that might arise from missing vari-
ables (Wooldridge, 2002). These time dummies 
might control for sporadic events like the global 
financial crisis. Some of these control variables, 
for example, FDI as a percent of GDP, and our 
main institutional variables have an inf luence 
on economic development. Bringing these var-
iables into the model also obviates the endoge-
neity of our economic development variable. In 
addition, since the full model is often more ro-
bust, we use our explanatory variables as con-
trols when necessary. 
4.2. Statistical procedures
We framed our analysis around the moderat-
ed mediation model (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 
2005), implied by our hypotheses. Moderated 
mediation occurs when a mediating effect is 
moderated by some variable (Baron & Kenny, 
1986).
We first developed the mediation model. 
Accordingly, we modelled the effect of formal 
incentives on economic development. We mod-
elled the effect of economic development on 
start-up activity. This latter model included all 
the controls, as well as our institutional varia-
bles – formal incentives and societal legitimacy. 
We used this model to not only test hypothesis 
2 – the main effect of economic development on 
start-up activity – but also to check if a nation’s 
formal incentives are significantly related to 
start-up activity when modelled together with 
economic development. To test for mediation, 
we need to develop models with and without the 
effect of the mediator variable (Baron & Kenny, 
1986). Accordingly, in a subsequent model, we 
removed the effect of economic development so 
that we can examine any change in the signif-
icance of formal incentives on start-up activi-
ty. Finally, we included the interaction effect of 
societal legitimacy and economic development 
to test a second stage moderation model. To ex-
amine the nature of the effect of societal legiti-
macy on the overall mediation model, we used 
an equation specified by Edwards and Lambert 
(2007) for second stage moderation. This equa-
tion enables one to calculate the simple slopes 
(Dawson & Richter, 2006) for a second stage 
moderated mediation model.
For the full moderated mediation model, we ex-
amined the sign of the interaction term. When the 
main effect terms have opposite signs, it indicates 
that one variable buffers or weakens the effect of 
the other. When they have the same sign, then a 
complementary or enhancing interaction is like-
ly. When both main effects have the same sign, 
but the higher order interaction term contains a 
different sign (Neter et al., 1996), then there is a 
compensating effect (J. Cohen, P. Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003).
We applied panel regression analysis to our data. 
The dataset was unbalanced, because a few coun-
tries did not participate in the survey for all years. 
Baltagi-Wu test values much smaller than 2 are 
suggestive of the need to correct for serial auto-
correlation (see Levie & Autio, 2008). We obtained 
a test value of 1.8 and we therefore ran generalized 
least squares (GLS) models without controlling for 
autocorrelation in error terms. 
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5. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive and summary sta-
tistics for our measures. Because we use actual GDP 
per capita values together with scales to measure for-
mal incentives and societal legitimacy, we standard-
ize our values for use in the regression models. This 
procedure also helps with multicollinearity, particu-
larly since we include interaction variables. However, 
our VIF values were less than 3; values above 10 in-
dicate a severe problem (Hair et al., 1995). For a rel-
atively small sample, like ours is, and particularly 
where t values are low, VIF values well below 5 are 
appropriate (O’Brien, 2007; Allison, 2012). 
We applied a random effects specification to our 
models. This works well for this unbalanced da-
ta set, because random effects use partial pooling 
and a shrinkage estimator, which pushes extreme 
values towards the mean (Wooldridge, 2002). In 
addition, random effects use both changes over 
time and between country effects to arrive at an 
estimate. However, fixed effects are useful to mit-
igate against any omitted variable bias. We there-
fore ran our full model with the fixed effects spec-
ification and arrived at similar results. We also se-
lected robust standard errors to mitigate against 
heteroscedasticity.
Hypothesis 1 proposed a positive correlation be-
tween the formal incentives and economic devel-
opment. This hypothesis was necessary to evalu-
ate stage one of the moderated mediation model, 
which indicates that the main explanatory varia-
ble formal incentives are indeed related to the me-
diating variable economic development. As shown 
in model 1 of Table 2, the relationship between 
formal incentives and economic development 
(b = 0.228, p < 0.01) is significant, which lends 
support to hypothesis 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations (for unstandardized values)
Measures Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Start-up rate 4.181 4.025 – – – – – –
2. Per capita GDP log 4.205 0.448 0.410* – – – – –
3. Established business activity 6.548 3.666 –0.019 –0.318* – – – –
4. FDI per GDP 5.464 8.829 0.172* 0.103 –0.175* – – –
5. Population (million) 30.253 77.626 –0.200* –0.466* 0.102 –0.115 – –
6. Formal incentives 2.555 0.412 0.471* 0.094 0.151* 0.137* 0.12 –
7. Societal legitimacy 2.882 0.338 0.469* 0.537* –0.120 0.167* –0.185* 0.491*
Note: n = 238, *p < .05.
Table 2. Regression results
Models
First stage Second stage Mediation test Moderated mediation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent variable Economic development Start-up rate Start-up rate Start-up rate
Population –0.150** –0.079 –0.148** –0.071
Transition economy dummy –0.730*** 0.137 0.007 0.230
Established business activity –0.081* –0.026 –0.078 –0.018
Foreign direct investment per GDP –0.035 0.135 .0.099 0.132
Societal legitimacy 0.019 0.184** 0.151* 0.215**
Formal incentives 0.228** 0.081 0.169* 0.078
Economic development (lagged) – 0.314** – 0.369**
Economic development x societal 
legitimacy – – – –0.079*
Constant –0.769*** –0.088 –0.530*** –0.070
Observations 238 155 238 155
Groups 57 38 57 38
Adjusted R-square 0.945 0.918 0.884 0.918
Chi-Square statistic 189.72*** 125.18*** 68.37*** 89.75***
Log likelihood –96.835 –87.714 –160.228 –86.876
AIC 231.671 211.427 356.455 211.427
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, year effects controlled for, but not shown, observations reduce when lagged variable for 
economic development is used.
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Hypothesis 2 proposed a positive correlation be-
tween the economic development and start-up ac-
tivity. Model 2 of Table 2 shows that this relation-
ship (b = 0.314, p < 0.01) is significant. This result 
lends support to hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 3 proposed that the effect of formal in-
centives on start-up activity is fully mediated by its 
effect on economic development. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 go some way in confirming the mediating effect 
of economic development, but scholars (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986) have advised to confirm this by de-
veloping models with and without the effect of the 
mediator variable. Model 2 shows the effect of for-
mal incentives on start-up activity with economic 
development. The effect (b = 0.081, p > 0.05) is not 
significant. However, when economic development 
is excluded in model 3, the effect of formal incen-
tives (b = 0.169, p < 0.05) becomes significant. This 
lends support to our hypothesis that economic 
development mediates the relationship between 
formal incentives and start-up activity.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that societal legitima-
cy moderates the indirect effect of formal incen-
tives on start-up activity such that this indirect 
effect decreases at high levels of societal legitima-
cy. Model 4 shows that the interaction between 
societal legitimacy and economic development 
(b = –0.079, p < .05) is negative and significant. 
We can thus proceed to investigate the nature of 
this interaction. 
In the case of a moderated mediation model, 
main effects refer to the indirect effect of formal 
incentives and the effect of societal legitimacy. 
Both main effects have the same positive sign, 
but the higher order interaction term contains a 
negative sign. This confirms a compensating ef-
fect between societal legitimacy and the indirect 
effect of formal incentives on start-up activity. 
We go further to interpret the moderating effect 
in terms of the entire mediating model, i.e. the 
indirect effect of formal incentives on start-up 
activity. We use Edwards and Lambert’s (2007) 
slope equation, choosing respective coefficient 
together with low and high value combinations 
of formal incentives and societal legitimacy and 
we arrive at the simple slopes depicted in Figure 
2. When we observe the simple slopes, we note 
that at high levels of societal legitimacy, the in-
direct effect of formal incentives is lower than 
at low levels of societal legitimacy. This lends 
support to hypothesis 4.
For robustness, we applied a fixed effects speci-
fication to our full model. This model caters for 
possible omitted variables by inserting all the 
country effects. We arrive at the same patterns. 
In addition, we delineated the formal incentives 
measure into separate government regulations 
and market openness dimensions and we tested 
these separately in our models. Notably, market 
openness appears to play a stronger role than 
government regulations in our models. The 
market openness measure comprises four items 
including the ease of entry into new markets, 
the cost of market entry, being blocked by es-
tablished firms and the effectiveness of compe-
tition legislation.
Figure 2. Simple slope results 
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6. DISCUSSION 
We set about examining how formal incentives in-
fluence national start-up activity. We found that 
formal incentives have an indirect and positive ef-
fect on start-up activity. Increases in formal in-
centives first lead to an increase in economic de-
velopment. The abundance of opportunities and 
resources in this economic developed environ-
ment together with the stronger incentives for en-
trepreneurship then lead to an increase in start-
up activity. We also find that this indirect effect of 
formal incentives is more important when levels 
of societal legitimacy for entrepreneurship are low. 
6.1. The indirect effect of formal 
incentives on start-up activity
The findings of the present research suggest that 
formal incentives, especially government’s efforts 
at maintaining open markets and implementing ef-
fective competition legislation are positively relat-
ed to start-up activity, albeit through an indirect 
process. As noted earlier, there are strong grounds 
for predicting such a relationship. Intuitively, the 
mere existence of opportunities and resources can-
not translate to start-up activity without formal 
incentives to enhance their profitable application 
and to spur the potential entrepreneur into action 
(Etzioni, 1987; Hayton et al., 2002; Thornton et al., 
2011). Moreover, formal incentives cannot influ-
ence start-up activity in isolation. Opportunities 
and resources are important to complement the 
design of formal incentives for start-up activity. 
We argued that differences in economic develop-
ment represent the variations in these opportuni-
ties and resources. 
As a result, formal incentives first stimulate the be-
ginnings of the transition to higher levels of eco-
nomic development before impacting on start-up 
activity. This might happen by incentivizing for-
eign investments in new technology (Ozawa, 1992; 
Young, Hood, & Peters, 1994). Formal incentives, 
particularly in the form of market-oriented reg-
ulations, become necessary for economic devel-
opment when it becomes increasingly complex to 
transact (Acs et al., 2008a; Acs & Virgill, 2010). For 
instance, when the economic structure advances 
through innovation, intellectual property laws 
ensure that the foreign enterprise owning the in-
novation will be protected from unsavory parties 
involved in potential market transactions. Under 
these circumstances, foreign investors become 
confident that they can appropriate the value at-
tached to their efforts (Autio & Acs, 2010). 
Much of national start-up activity results when the 
entrepreneur rather than generating them instead 
captures profit opportunities from the technolog-
ical development accompanying early economic 
development (Kirzner, 1973). Potential entrepre-
neurs then recognize these opportunities from 
changes in technology to produce variants of ser-
vices and inputs to large manufacturing enterpris-
es (Ciccone & Matsuyama, 1996). These include 
the opportunities to start manufacturing and 
service type businesses within the supply chains 
of the pioneer businesses. Formal incentives help 
turn these initially ordinary opportunities to prof-
it opportunities – the kind of opportunities that 
attract entrepreneurs. Of course, once start-up ac-
tivity increases during the transitory stage of eco-
nomic development, it begins to also play a role 
in increasing the momentum towards economic 
development.
Our findings integrate past research. We confirm 
Levie and Autio’s (2008) arguments that opportu-
nity perception serves to mediate between formal 
type institutions and start-up activity. Our use of 
longitudinal data allows us to use differences and 
changes in economic development to proxy the dif-
ferences and changes in opportunity perceptions 
that might occur across and within countries.  
6.2. The moderating effect  
of societal legitimacy
We also confirm Stephan and Uhlaner’s (2010) ar-
gument that the cultural norms that lend legitima-
cy to start-up activity are of a higher order than 
formal incentives. We however argue that it serves 
as a condition on the indirect effect of formal in-
centives on start-up activity and not as a primary 
explanatory variable of national start-up activity.
Suppliers of resources readily support entrepre-
neurs when start-up activity is viewed as legit-
imate, which increases start-up rates (Etzioni, 
1987). When legitimacy is not present, informa-
tion asymmetries occur, which then leads to dif-
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ficulty in accessing resources and even thwarting 
the start of businesses (Spencer et al., 2005). Aside 
from resources providers, the society surrounding 
the potential entrepreneur also includes custom-
ers, suppliers, and other stakeholders such as legis-
lators – a collective also important to turn start-up 
activity into a successful outcome.
We found that the indirect effect of formal incen-
tives on national start-up activity becomes pro-
nounced when the levels of societal legitimacy for 
start-up activity is particularly low. This makes 
sense when we consider North’s (1990) argument 
that both formal and informal institutions serve 
as the incentive structure for economic activi-
ty. This incentive structure is held in place when 
informal and formal institutions can compensate 
for one another. In other words, they substitute for 
each other.
There has been research that alludes to a multi-
plicative or enhancing effect where such formal 
and informal institutions serve complements of 
each other. Meek, Pacheco, and York (2010) sug-
gest that government-sponsored incentives are 
more effective at promoting start-up activity in 
the solar energy sector when surrounded by or 
greater levels of family interdependence or great-
er individual freedom. Future research can look 
at whether decomposing formal and informal in-
stitutions into individual components results in 
different interaction behavior compared to when 
considering each institution as a whole. 
6.3. Practical implications
Reformers wishing to increase the rates of start-
up activity within their societies must under-
stand the current rule structure from both an 
incentive and a legitimacy perspective. We have 
shown that it is particularly important for gov-
ernments of societies where start-up activity 
enjoys low levels of legitimacy to design strong 
formal incentives. 
The mental models of potential entrepreneurs, 
various state officials, and resources providers 
shape the choices they make. When these men-
tal models regard start-up activity as legitimate, 
they can then stimulate start-up activity despite 
the presence of relatively weak levels of formal 
incentives. Potential entrepreneurs still perceive 
support from resource providers and resultant 
lower transaction costs providing a substitute 
incentive for them to start a business.
Among less developed countries, as investments 
take place in upgrading existing technology and 
even moving into new technology, opportuni-
ties for start-up activity increase. This increase 
in resources both technological, financial and 
the potential for skills transfer from investors 
might lead to an increase in start-up activity if 
reformers can construct incentives for individ-
uals to exploit these opportunities. Reformers 
cannot simply design these incentives based on 
successes among exemplar countries without 
accounting for differences in the cultural and 
economic contexts in their respective country. 
Further complexity arises when policies im-
plemented adequately within urban areas lag 
among significant rural populations who still 
follow a set of rules based on tradition and his-
tory (Ollila, 2009). 
It becomes necessary to target societal legiti-
macy when it becomes costly for governments 
to provide incentives. Though the malleability 
of societal legitimacy is in dispute, targeting 
change might begin with educational invest-
ments (Autio, 2009) and practical experience 
(Boettke et al., 2008). Until these are in place, 
reformers must realize that efforts to impose 
institutions, whether internally- or external-
ly-driven, will fail. Reformers could start with 
designing the educational system to infuse stu-
dents with entrepreneurial attitudes, and to 
provide encouraging role models. Those with 
tertiary education generally face the magnitude 
of opportunity costs that motivate one to target 
high growth enterprises that are formally reg-
istered. Reformers must therefore promote en-
trepreneurial content in higher educational in-
stitutions. In addition, reformers could promote 
the sharing of experiences for established entre-
preneurs and aspiring ones (Autio, 2009). Such 
efforts ought to bear fruits over the long term.
Reformers might start by identifying particular 
indigenous traditions that are in synergy with 
property rights, trade, and individual liber-
ty (Boettke et al., 2008) that they can leverage 
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within their policy design. The multidiscipli-
nary nature of entrepreneurship exists even at 
a macro level. This calls for the requisite multi-
disciplinary policy approach. Thus, the design 
of formal operations should prioritize the align-
ment of diverse formal departments to the na-
tional goal of entrepreneurship development. 
6.4. Limitations and future research
One cannot adequately cover all of the nuances of 
vast topics such as institutions, economic devel-
opment, and entrepreneurship. Nonetheless, this 
research has sought to provide some basic insights 
into the mechanism and conditions in which for-
mal incentives influence national start-up activi-
ty, which the majority of researchers have steered 
clear off until recently. Several limitations of our 
study provide opportunities for future research.
This study is limited to entrepreneurship in the 
formal private sector: we used data of formally 
registered new firms per country. We recommend 
that our research be replicated with data recog-
nizing both formal and informal sector start-up 
activity.
Our data were limited to 238 country-year obser-
vations. We also used lagged variables to control 
for endogeneity and the time taken for the context 
to influence individual level behavior, further re-
ducing our data to 155 country-year observations. 
Large sampling frameworks of country level data 
are hard to come by. We suggest that our research 
be replicated as sampling frameworks increase 
their country level data. We used GEM data for 
our institutional measures. The World Bank has 
a larger data set of institutional variables, but re-
search might still be limited by start-up activity 
data. In particular, future research should target a 
larger sample of less-developed countries.
The GEM EFC data are based on impressions of 
experts, rather than ‘‘hard’’ data (Levie & Autio, 
2008). These experts might have an ideal of en-
trepreneurs based on several values and attitudes, 
but those values may not be determinants of start-
up activity in some regions (Alvarez, Urbano, 
Coduras, & Ruiz-Navarro, 2011). For this reason, it 
might be that though some of the GEM EFCs did 
not lend empirical support to conditions for start-
up activity, others like the World Bank’s Doing 
Business data might do. Aside from replicating 
our work with other datasets, future research 
might consider multilevel methods that analyze 
for both individual and country level responses. 
Recent work by De Clercq et al. (2011), and Autio 
and Acs (2010) provide exemplars of multilevel 
methods applied to entrepreneurship research. 
Different types of effects – substitution or com-
plementary – might exist when one considers 
only particular components of formal or infor-
mal institutions. This requires careful modelling. 
However, one should balance this against the need 
for a parsimonious model. Future research could 
apply structural equation modelling to analyze 
for a more comprehensive range of interplay and 
endogeneity.
Further nuances arise when one considers the or-
igins of certain institutions. Institutions can be 
created indigenously by national governments or 
by outsiders when they are foreign-introduced. 
Foreign institutions tend to be constructed and 
imposed in a top-down manner. Foreign institu-
tions are those we typically associate with devel-
opment community policy. These may be crea-
tions of foreign governments or other formal au-
thorities like the IMF, USAID, or the World Bank 
(Boettke et al., 2008). 
We believe that current explanations of cross-coun-
try start-up activity omit variations due to either 
one of formal institutions, informal institutions, 
or economic development. These gaps continue to 
exist because of the complex causality and nonlin-
ear relationships between institutions, economic 
development, and start-up activity. Clearly, there 
is a room for future research to delve into this 
complexity. Cognitive dissonance theory might 
be helpful in this regard. The theory of cognitive 
dissonance centres on the idea that if an individu-
al realizes that things are not psychologically con-
sistent with one another, he will, in a variety of 
ways, try to make them more consistent (Festinger, 
1957). Cognitive dissonance might arise in indi-
viduals facing conflicting incentives. Our research 
suggests the importance of analyzing the joint ef-
fects of formal and informal institutions to detect 
the cognitive dissonance between incentives and 
the legitimacy of starting a business.
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CONCLUSION
Our research contributes to existing knowledge about national start-up activity by showing both the 
mechanism and conditions for formal incentives to increase start-up activity. We have shown that the 
formal incentives, designed by governments, influence national start-up activity in an indirect manner 
through the variations in opportunities and resources made available through technological advance-
ment or economic development. This is in line with arguments that economic development results from 
the adoption of particular institutions and not entrepreneurship, which is an “omnipresent aspect of hu-
man action” (Boettke & Coyne, 2003, p. 67). Moreover, we show that this indirect effect of formal incen-
tives becomes particularly important under conditions of low societal legitimacy for entrepreneurship. 
Essentially, formal incentives serve as a substitute for lower levels of societal legitimacy.
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